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Abstract. A mathematical model of chemically mediated plant/herbivore interaction dy- 
-is developed in the context of the assumptions basic to Optimal Foraging and Op- 
timal Defense Theories (Rhoades). Evidently, plants produce some important defensive 
chemicals in allometric proportion to biomass, and are also capable of spontaneous re- 
sponse to damage caused by physical stress and/or herbivore attack, by actually in- 
creasing percentages of these chemicals in plant tissues over as short a time as a few 
hours. In addition, herbivores have evolved offensive strategies to counter the plants' 
defenses. Our mathematical theory centers on a differential zero-sum game in produc- 
tion/consumption space. However, the associated discrete game with noise and particu- 
lar sequences ofptiy, is also considered. The concept of a zero-sum production/con- 
sumption game as a representation of an interactive coeuobed two species predator-prey 
system is basic to our approach. The dynamics of the game are developed in a series of 
biological arguments ending finally with a pair of second order, nonlinear, coupled, 
symmetric tiffing osciZZators with variable second order damping. Plant vigour or re- 
sistance may be studied in terms of properties of this damping which depends upon chem- 
ical response levels in plant tissues. Both plant and herbivore players use bang-bang 
controls and automatic feedback programs. To be explicit, the plant controls are the 
Rhoades' Response Parameter (v) and the coefficients of paZat&itity (~~6). The 
herbivore's controls are its coefficient of aggregation (Y) and its coefficient of 
foraging efficiency (I@). The parameter 6 has been proved identifiubZe by us, 
elsewhere. As an outcome of this theory locusts and Larch budmoths. can be success- 
fully modelled as alternating herbivore strategies, first steattky y = 0 and then 
Opportunistic Y >O, in a singZe zero-.sum iproductia/conswnption)-game. Thus, the 
(Larch/Larch budmoth)-system is quite different from the "cooperative behaviour" of 
limit cycle models, when viewed from the zero-sum game perspective. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the present paper we briefly describe a mathe- 
matical theory of plant/herbivore conflict based 
on current hvootheses that interactions between 
plants and herbivores are strongly influenced by 
evolved defensive adaotations of olants and com- 
plementary offensive~adaptations of herbivores 
which enable them to partly overcome these de- 
fenses. It has recently been discovered that 
plants possess allelochemicals whose amounts spon- 
taneously increase so that the percentages of tan- 
nins, lignins and other defensive compounds in- 
crease in plant tissues, when they are attacked by 
herbivores. These defensive reactions of plants, 
which can be as rapid as a few hours, have nega- 
tive impact on herbivore fitness by reducing the 
digestibility of plant tissues, direct toxic ac- 
tion, and inhibition of feeding. Conversely, phys- 
ical stress of plants often has a positive effect 
on herbivores by increasing the level of nutrients 
in plants and weakening plant chemical defenses. 
Plants in fact appear to be active controllers of 
their defense just as herbivores are of their at- 
tack. Herbivores have evolved the ability to 
avoid plant defensive systems or reduce their ef- 
fects. Granted that the plant and herbivore are 
both active controllers, there is an obvious con- 
flict. In the present paper, we lay the founda- 
tions of a mathematical theory describing this 
conflict with explicit roles for chemical defenses 
and offensive adaptations, in the context of a 
differential game, in biomass state space. The 
game is between two active players in which each 
player attempts to reach a certain well-defined 
target region along trajectories in the biomass 
state space. Given suitable strategies there will 
be subsets of this space from which initial posi- 
tions guarantee winning for a player against all 
possible strategies of the/other player and vice 
versa. These are called the strong playability 
sets. Generally. there is a subset from which nei- 
ther olaver is a definite winner. Finally. the 
players may attempt to minimize their costs (pro- 
duction or consumption) leading to a compromising 
"saddle condition" or qualitative Nash equilibrium 
with the value of the game set up on the so-called 
barrier surface (if it exists) between the two re- 
gions of strong playability. This is a quantita- 
tive zero-sum differential game. Mathematical de- 
tails will appear elsewhere. 
2. PASSIVE PLANT DEFENSE THEORY 
According to Rhoades, "During the last thirty years 
it has become clear that many of the chemical con- 
stituents of plants (plant secondary metabolites) 
protect plants against attack from pathogens and 
herbivores, and are used by plants to interfere 
with the growth or germination of competing plants." 
With respect to herbivores, the biologically sa- 
lient features of passive plant defense theory can 
be summarized as follows. Each species of plant 
has evolved a unique set of defensive metabolites 
which deter attack from herbivores except those few 
species which have "broken through" the defenses by 
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counter adaptation. Each species of herbivore has 
evolved counter adaptations against the defenses 
of a limited number of plant species. Herbivores 
use the plant defensive systems to which they are 
adapted as host-finding cues and feeding stimu-.. 
lants, while avoiding plant species containing de- 
fensive systems to which they are not adapted and 
those tissues of their host species which contain 
levels of defensive substances sufficient to over- 
load the accommodation mechanisms of the herbiv- 
ores. Thus, apart frcm containing defensive chem- 
icals, the ptants are regarded as passive and their 
defenses are regarded as static. 
3. ACTIVE PLANT DEFENSE THEORY 
Stress on plants takes the form of water deficit 
or surplus, unusual or rapidly changing climatic 
conditions, nutrient poor soils, competition with 
other plants, pollution, and damage during cultur- 
ing operations. According to Rhoades, "During the 
last ten years, we have recognized that plants 
also possess inducible (control) defenses against 
herbivores. Pkmts can change their chemical 
properties to render their tissues less suitable 
for herbivore growth and development in direct re- 
sponse to herbivore damage or s&toted herbivore 
damage. Rapid responses, which affect current 
herbivores, and delayed responses, which protect 
plants against subsequent generations of herbiv- 
ores, are known. Responses do not appear to be 
restricted to plants of any particular taxonomic 
affinity or growth form. The systemic a~~wmd.~~- 
tion of phenotic and terpenoid compounds is the 
most common type of response seen so far, particu- 
larly in trees subjected to leaf damage." 
4. A CONTROL MODEL OF ACTIVE PLANT DEFENSE THEORY 
We now write the control equations for plant/her- 
bivore interactions. In doing so, it will be con- 
venient to use the standard notation ic = dx/dt, 
q = d2q/dt2. 
The system is evolving in the time interval 
[t,,t,] and is expressed as 
ji+(Xa+vx)(~)2+u,G~q+Xjc+ax=E1(x,~,t). 
(4.1) 
;i+(~~-~q)(4)2+u2a;4+Eiltbq=E2(q.il,t), 
where E'(x,i,t) and E*(q.q.t) are continuous 
functions representing physica stress (including 
weather stress) on the plant and herbivore, re- 
spectively. These functions need not be known ex- 
plicitly. It is only required that they have a 
known bound, M, in the following sense: 
0~lE'(x.ic,t).~+E2(q,4,t).41 <MC-. (4.la) 
Furthermore, we suppose there is no stress when 
there is no biomass production or consumption, so 
that, 
E'(0,O.t) = E*(O,O,t)= 0 
for all te [t,,t,]. 
(4.lb) 
When 6=0, the herbivore population will decrease. 
Therefore, we must require positive dumping of the 
sort expressed by 
E+(EY-IIq)II.O. (4.lc) 
This condition restricts controls Y and u= -V 
to 
ogYminiY>114+U(q/E)t 'IYmax (4.ld) 
where Y is an infinitesimal quantity used to se- 
cure for y a compact control interval 
[Ymin'Ymax 1. We also require the damping 
X+(Xa+vx)i>O. (4.le) 
The pZant controZ parameters are v and UJ. We 
are interested in two types of admissible controls. 
The first is an v-controt with vc [urnin, and 
'min 
=-n o with, no > 0, and 
v= 
1 if i/x < 0 
(4.2) 
-n 0 
if i/x 2 0 
where -no indicates maximal plant response. This 
is a discontinuous trigger controZ set off by too 
great a consumption rate. The other control is 
given by 
min 
u 
9 , 4<0 
= 
1 I UT"". (4.2a) 4 2 0, 
where generally, M, ) u, 1. -M, , M, > 0 and u, 
a constant control. These two classes of acbnissi- 
bZe controls model, the plant's inducible defenses. 
The induced defensive response equation is 
T=d-mgv, (4.3) 
v 6 cv,,,,11. The herbivore control parameters are 
Y and u2. Similarly, as for v and u,, we are 
interested in the Program (feedback) 
I Ymax’ 4<0 Y’ Ymin' 4 LO. (4.3a) 
where ymex and Ymin are assumed known for field 
and laboratory studies. Furthermore, the foraging 
efficiency program u2 has just the reverse parity 
from u, : 
max 
u2 ’ 
min 
u2 ’ 
i<O 
(4.3b) 
iLO. 
We tiZZ be able to concZude from the game theory of 
Zater sections that a plant, suffering moderate 
herbivore attack or moderate weather stress or phys- 
icnt stress, can via proper choice of controls, re- 
turn to a neighborhood of the equizibrium state. 
In fact, this strategy may be chosen optimatty 
(thereby keeping plant damage to a minimum). This 
is one of our main conclusions. 
We define 6, = u,6, 62 = u26, 6 > 0 where u, 
is a parameter in [-M,,M,], and u2 E [-M2,M2]. 
We also take M,>O and M2>0. The parameter u, 
associated with 6, , the palatability, we term the 
indigestibility coefficient. The parameter u2 
associated with 62, the foraging efficiency, we 
term the foraging efficiency coefficient. As u, 
increases, indigestibility of the plant tissue 
being attacked increases beyond its basaZ tevet, 
u,=l. As u2 increases the herbivore is getting 
more value nutritionally per unit volume consumed. 
Hence his foraging efficiency is increasing. 
5. INTRODUCTION TO THE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE GAME 
We shall first discuss the so-called quazitative 
objectives, such as securing survival levels for 
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plant and herbivore, for our differential game. 
Then we will discuss the so-called optima2 mode of 
ptay in which player 2, the herbivore, selects 
controls which maximize his consumption and play- 
er 1, the plant, selects controls which minimize 
player l's consumption. It is in this optimality 
setting that the so-called quantitative pm with 
a value makes sense for plant/herbivore interac- 
tions. It is also referred to as a zero-sum dif- 
fePentiaZ game. 
The qualitative objectives will require (permanent) 
capture of the trajectories in suitable compact 
target subsets el,e2 in the playing region A of 
our phase space R4. The winning of the plant 
means that the soZutions shouZd reach and stay in 
some neighborhood of the equiZibriwn IO1 E R”. 
Moreover, the pZant wouM want x,k higher than 
the toZerabZe ZeveZs of q,q , hence 
y - Ymax. 
The winning of the herbivore means to reach and 
stay at a certain q,q-ZeveZ whiZe the x,i-suppZy 
is a280 sufficient, i.e. 
e2=~X~A~~x~)cl~1./q~~c2):,~~~~~r 
ltll &9 Y = Ymax’ 
and where e n e = $. Note that the condition 
141 ) l/y-~ 'derides from the negation of the 
positive damping condition (at equilibrium) and 
that -(g/a)z?z(g/P) comes from the solution of 
the logistic taken at equilibrium. 
6. THE QUALITATIVE SEMI-GAMES 
The total energy of the conservative subsystem is 
H(X) = i (n'+q') + i (ax*+bq*), (6.1) 
and its total derivative along the (whole system) 
trajectory k(t) is 
H(X.t) = E'(x,i,t)i- [(~u+vx)R+X](~)*-u,64~* 
+ 4E2(q&t) - [E+ (Ev-us):];* 
- u2&. 
Observe that the derivative becomes negative for 
all 6 E ["min,6max] if 
U14i2 + u*42R 2;. V6 E [a min”maxl. (6.2) 
This is possible because of the ranges of u, and 
9 * The strong playability region Af is de- 
fined by 
mi: ma; H(x,t) + Cl (0, (6.3) 
or equivalently by 
E'(x.ic.t)l-max[(aa+vx)l+x](ic)' -mua;(ulS4(i)') 
v 
+ E'(q.q,t)q- min[k+kv-d)41(q)2 
Y 
- min(u2si(q)*) + (vi-v;)/T, 5 0, 
"2 
for all 6 E [6min,6max]. 
The strong playability for player 2 region A: 
is defined by 
m$xmJnA(&t) +c220, (6.4) 
or equivalently by, 
E1(x,i,t)ic-max[(~u+vx)ic+~](k)2-rr;qx(u,6~(k)2) 
" 
+ E2(q,4,t)4-minlc+(Ev-uq)41(4)* 
Y 
- mi;(u,a($*i) + (vf-v;)/T, 5 0, 
for all 6 E [6min,6max]. Recall that y = -p . 
7. COMPOSITE QUALITATIVE GAME 
The condition 
","2" muii H(X,t) = muiln ma2x li(X,t) = 0 (7.1) 
defines the barrier. 
requires -cl =c 
Indeed, B = aai n aA: # o 
2' Thus, 
VI - v1 2 2 
c e ‘c-‘e _ 
Tl 
+-------0, 
T2 
(7.2) 
which implies the barrier is nonempty. The game 
value V is defined on the barrier. 
A discrete time-step version, with noise, of our 
model is possible. Following Fleming, one con- 
siders the difference equation analogue together 
with a season-by-season description of the se- 
quence of pZay in which the plant always plays 
first, or vice-versa, in each time-step. Simulta- 
neously, one introduces Gaussian white noise into 
these difference equations in standard fashion. 
Shrinking the time-steps results in a stochastic 
extension of the barrier equation (or Isaacs- 
Bellman equation) in the form of a parabolic dif- 
ferential equation 
$ v*V t min max(vV. F) = 0, 
ul u* 
(7.3) 
with appropriate initial conditions and boundary 
conditions to guarantee existence of a unique solu- 
tion V. This V function is the limit of val- 
ues of the discrete noisy versions. 
8. OPTIMAL GAME 
Granted the strong l-playability for the capture 
in e1 (i.e. the strong winning of the plant) let 
us consider now the conditions under which the 
plant can optimize its gain and at the same time 
what the herbivore can do to oppose it. This means 
to consider the optimal (quantitative) zero-sum 
differential game between these two players, the 
cost being the amount to be consumed by the herbiv- 
ore along the solutions k(2) tendi;g to T'. 2 Let 
!;(;;note the cost functional by Q(X ,k(.),P ,P ,t)= 
. The pay-off of the game will then be the 
value of Q(t) at the terminal instant tf of 
reaching e2 , i.e. -q(t,) = Q(X",k(.),P1,P2.tf). 
It is well known, cf. Blaquiere-Gerard-Leitmann, 
that the game has the value if and only if there 
are admissible P:.P: 
we have 
such that given (X".tO)E A: 
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Q(x",k,P:,P2)~Q(Xo,k,P:,P:)IQ(Xo.P'~P:) (8.1) 
for all admissible P',P',k(.) 6 K(X',tO) and ql7 
t 2 t0 + T, . 
Neither of the players can do better than playing 
Pi. Thus when the plant chooses Pi, no matter 
what the herbivore does, we will always render the 
pay-off 2 Q(Pk,P2). Similarly, when the herbiv- 
ore chooses P$ no matter which winning PI is 
chosen, we will always render at least Q(P'.P:). 
In this fashion, the pZant can minimize damage 
from the herbivore, while the herbivore can sirnut- 
taneously mozimize its consumption as measured by 
Q(t), within the winning frame of the plant. 
It follows-as the necessary condition of OUP 
optimization-that 
i$n ma2x [VP*(X). f(X,t,u',u')] = 0 (8.2) 
for all "i,j E P!>j(X,6). 
Similar but inverted optimization of Q(t) can be 
produced on A: with the herbivore being the pre- 
dicted winner and the plant only delaying its own 
destruction. 
9. STEALTH, OPPORTUNISM AND HERBIVORE POPULATION 
DYNAMICS 
Consider the differential game of previous sec- 
tions. In the presence of a stealthy herbivore 
(v=P=D), a plant that is close to equilibrium 
should be able to remain close. This property is 
a consequence of our game model. Thus, if the 
herbivore is stealthy, then as long as physical 
stress is not too Large, the controls u,,v wilZ 
alla, the plat to stay near, OF return to, a 
neighborhood of the equilibriwn which is in the 
plants region of strong winning, and do so opti- 
mally. The existence of the barrier 8 insures 
the existence of a value V for the game. This 
implies that the plant can minimize &age from 
the herbivore if appropriate ioptimaL) choices of 
"1 are made. SimultaneousZy, a low density popu- 
lation of herbivores can survive by (optimal) 
choice of relatively high u2-values. These UP- 
values may be triggers for chemical suppressors of 
recognition by the plant. 
For opportunistic herbivores (yf D) the situa- 
tion is different. This type of herbivore pref- 
erentially attacks plants whose defenses are com- 
promised already by physical stress. Thus, E' is 
relatively large and at the beginning of some dis- 
crete time-step or season, the plcott finds its 
state in the region of the herbivore's strong win- 
ning. For the herbivore, increasing y increases 
the cooperative aggregation effect and thereby in- 
duces the dmage dependent response in a healthy 
plant. But, for a plant suffering severe stress 
this is not possible so that the state remains in 
the herbivores' region of strong winning. In this 
situation the plant may die. 
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